A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). This article about an American illustrator is a stub.
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